如果结果不匹配，请 
更多“超硬磨料磨具的浓度假设为100℅，则在1cm3体积中含料为0…”相关的问题
证明定理16.4(有限覆盖定理)
设
为一有有界闭域,{∆α}为一开域族,它覆盖了D(即
),则在{∆α}必存在有限个开集,∆1,∆2,...,∆n,它们同样覆益了D(即
).
努力水平。工人选择他的收入减去努力以后的净工资w-e(努力的单位成本假设为1)最大化的努力水平。根据下列每种工资安排，确定努力水平和利润水平(收入减去支付的工资)。解释为什么这些不同的委托-代理关系产生不同的结果。
(1)对于e≥1, w=2;否则w=0。
(2)w=R/2。
(3)w=R-12.5。
A firm's short-run revenue is given by R= 10e-e2 , where e is the level of effort by a typical worker (all workers are assumed to be identical). A worker chooses his level of effort to maximize his wage net of effort w-e (the per-unit cost of effort is assumed to be 1). Determine the level of effort and the level of profit (revenue less wage paid) for each of the following wage arrangements.
Explain why these differing principal-agent relationships generate different outcomes.
a. w=2 for e≥1; otherwise w =0,
b. w= R/2.
c. w=R-12.5.
